



# The new price environment and implications for Doha negotiations

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IPC, ICTSD, IFPRI workshop  
Washington DC May 1, 2008

# ICP, ICTSD & IFPRI collaboration

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- **Assess in detail the last draft Doha Round modalities (Feb. 2008) on**
  - market access
  - domestic support
- **Key markets studied**
  - **US**: Brandford, Laborde and Martin
  - **EU**: Jean, Josling and Laborde
  - **India**: Gopinath and Laborde (forthcoming)


**Both offensive and defensive interests are analyzed for each country**

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# **The Doha negotiations in the new high food prices context**

# The new situation: Surge in prices

Commodity prices (US\$/ton)



# India and China: World vs. domestic prices


## India

January 2005 = 100







## China

January 2005 = 100




Source: Data from Reserve Bank of India 2008, National Bureau of Statistics of China 2008 and FAO 2008.


# World prices reach into East African countries



# Higher input costs: Global fertilizer prices tripled in 2007




# Energy cost shares in agriculture




# IFPRI's scenarios

[Models for changes in structural supply and demand factors  
(2000-05 and 2006-15)]

US\$/ton




# Small quantity changes have large effects on cereal prices



# Cereals: The world eats more than it produces

Million tons



Source: Data from FAO 2003, 2005-08.

\* Forecast.

# Protecting trade

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- **High prices have driven selfish national policies with short term vision:**
  - Export bans
  - Export taxes
  
- **Stronger disciplines on these tools are needed to**
  - Protect importers and food security
  - Protect domestic producers and boost investment

# Major producers and net exporters (2004-06)

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## Cereal producers

**China**

**USA \***

**India \***

**Russia \***

**Indonesia**

**France \***

**Brazil\***

**Canada \***

**Germany \***

**Vietnam\***

**Kazakhstan\***

## Oilseed producers

**USA \***

**Indonesia**

**China**

**Malaysia**

**Brazil \***

**India \***

**Argentina \***

*in red = restricting exports*

Source: FAO 2008.

Note: \* Indicates that the country is a net exporter of cereals or oilseeds.

# Some CGE Modeling: Scenarios

*by Antoine Boüet, Betina Dimaranan April 2008*

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- **Scenario 1: energy shocks from 2001 to 2007 [grain price + 7%]**
- **Scenario 2: = scenario 1 + biofuel subsidies in the EU and the US implemented from 2001 to 2007 [grain price + 16%]**
- **Scenario 3: = Scenario 2 + export bans, export taxation, and removal of some import duties implemented in 2008 [grain price + 49%]**

**Note: to be interpreted with caution; *early draft results of MIRAGE modeling (to be further reviewed); model does not include expectations or speculation***

# Rethinking agricultural trade liberalization?

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- **Traditional objectives: *remain important !***
  - promote trade
  - limit distortions
  - increase agricultural world prices
- **Need to adapt the means to the new situation:**
  - Rising prices hurts the poorest
  - Food price inflation and general inflation / macro implications
  - Reducing subsidies has reduced grain stocks
  - Interdependence of economies (e.g. export bans)
  - Speculation and price formation at the exchanges

# Updating policies

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- **Toward an efficient and “pro-development” domestic support framework:**
  - Improving productivity
  - Giving needed support to poor country farmers
- **Improving world market efficiency:**
  - Better producer/consumer price transmission to boost production
  - The role of international traders and the role of speculation
  - Who should care for global competition policy?

# The role of binding commitments

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- **High prices have driven reduction in domestic support and unilateral tariff reductions**
- **A lot of “water” exists in current commitments**
- **Current formula will not deliver immediate gains but will secure the future**
- **Binding the future policy is a key element to promote long-term private investment**

# Food aid discipline

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- **The need for international food aid is rising**
- **Stronger discipline (“in cash” vs. “in kind”), may deter domestic political incentives to provide food aid**
- **The role of the “safe box” (annex L in the modalities) is to shelter emergency aid**

# High prices change the driving forces of the negotiations?

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- **Accepting tariff and domestic support reduction is now easier since current level have been driven down “naturally”**
- **But, agricultural interest groups have less appetite for trade negotiations**

# **From Doha to Bali: Trade and environment**

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- **Trade and environment negotiations need to be linked**
- **Ensuring the sustainable development of trade:**
  - Pricing the externalities of trade and transport (solution outside the WTO)

# Policy actions to correct and mitigate the food price problem: Trade must be part of it

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## Global policies and international aid

1. **Trade:** Eliminate agricultural trade barriers, and export bans; revisit grain based biofuels
2. **Agriculture growth:** Expand aid for rural infrastructure, services, agricultural research and technology (CGIAR)
3. **Protection of the vulnerable:** Expand food and nutrition related development aid, incl. safety nets, child nutrition, employment programs