



The Consequences for the European Union of the WTO Revised Draft Modalities for Agriculture

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Introduction*

The EU has been playing a more active role in setting the agenda for the agricultural component of the Doha Round than it did in the Uruguay Round and in earlier GATT rounds.¹ The Commission, negotiating on behalf of Member States, has tried to avoid the defensive position that gave it little room to suggest changes in the rules that it would favor. In particular it wanted to avoid being isolated as the main defender of protectionist agricultural programs, and risk being blamed for resisting further progress in bringing agricultural trade rules closer to those in the non-agricultural sector.

This new position has indeed had a major impact on the conduct of the negotiations. Although transatlantic tensions still exist, often over issues such as regulations regarding biotech food and the use of place names for trademarks, the past five years has seen a noticeable convergence of EU and US positions on agricultural trade rules. The conflicts that are prolonging the Doha Round agricultural talks are more often between the US and the EU on the one hand and developing countries on the other. Both the US and the EU have agreed that there will be significant cuts in tariffs, subject to partial exclusions for sensitive products, and major reductions in the allowable level of trade-distorting domestic support. The elimination of export subsidies is no longer a significant point of contention, although there are still differences in the area of food aid.

The main reason why the EU can be so much less defensive in its approach to trade talks is in the progress it has made with domestic reform of agricultural policy. The MacSharry reforms of 1992 allowed the EU to agree to disciplines on domestic and export subsidies in the Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture (URAA), as well as resolving the oilseed controversy. Cereal prices were cut to bring them closer to world prices and oilseed hectareage was restrained. Payments that were made in compensation for price cuts were placed in the Blue Box, and thus avoided mandated reductions. Support given through administered prices also declined, in part as a result of the use of the difference between these prices and fixed reference prices for the calculation of the subsidy element. So the partially-reformed CAP had no difficulty staying within the bounds of the EU's schedule of subsidy reductions in the first few years.

Further reforms have had a similar impact, lowering the level of trade-distorting subsidies and making it easier for the EU to contemplate and accept further restrictions on agricultural policies in the WTO. In this connection, the changes in 1999 (the Agenda 2000 reforms) and the subsequent significant changes in 2003 and 2004 under the leadership of Commissioner Fischler have continued and developed the approach taken by MacSharry. Price support has been removed or weakened for many commodities, and payments are now made to farmers on the basis of historical production of a wide range of products with no obligation to produce any particular product to claim payment. This

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¹ We use the term EU for the collective position and interest of the European Union rather than the technically correct term EC, preferred in WTO documents.

“Single Farm Payment” has made the CAP significantly more consistent with the “tariffs and decoupled payments” model that underlies the URAA.

To what extent would a successful conclusion of the Doha Development Agenda (DDA), along the lines of the modalities in the Revised Draft Modalities paper of February 8, 2008, require further changes in the Common Agricultural Policy? Will those changes be made easier by corresponding disciplines on the domestic programs of other countries? How much increased market access is likely to be generated as a result of cuts in tariffs that would be required of the EU? Can the EU expect to expand its own exports of agricultural products as a result of the tariff cuts of others? Will the termination of the EU’s use of export subsidies to balance its internal market have any significant impact on price levels and on world market conditions? And to what extent will the modification of the export policies of competitors help the EU to move away from export subsidies? What other issues will the EU insist on as it moves towards a package that is acceptable to Member States?

This paper attempts to address these issues, as a way of exploring the domestic and international implications of a Modalities agreement. The first section of the paper gives some background information on the nature of the CAP as it relates to the disciplines introduced in the URAA. This section is useful to give some perspective on the potential impact of the DDA as it relates to the recent development of the CAP. A second section reviews briefly the main “offensive” and “defensive” positions of the EU, so as to be able to evaluate the extent to which the modalities draft addresses these issues. This perspective is relevant to the political reactions that will determine the acceptability of the Modalities. The next three sections discuss in more detail the implications of the domestic support, market access and export competition modalities, and give an interpretation of the WTO disciplines as a constraint on future policy developments. A final section attempts an overall assessment of the impacts of the suggested modalities on the EU and on its negotiating interests.

1. The CAP and WTO Disciplines

The level of farm support in the EU has historically been high relative to that of many other countries. The high level of that support has been criticized by trading partners, as has the nature of the support measures used. The CAP was introduced forty-five years ago, when agriculture in the original six members was still recovering from the devastation of the Second World War. Countries agreed on the need to offer secure markets within the EU through protection against imports and the purchase of surplus products for disposal abroad. Import protection was given by means of a levy that varied inversely with world prices (a variable levy) so that imports would enter the domestic market at a predetermined threshold price. On the export side, a subsidy (restitution) was paid that covered the difference between domestic intervention prices (at which supplies were purchased off the domestic market) and the world price.² Thus domestic prices were supported at a level that reflected a political decision by the (Agricultural) Council of

² Both the threshold price and the intervention price were linked to a target price that was intended to give an acceptable level of farm income. The system described here operated for cereals: other products had regimes of a broadly similar nature.

Ministers meeting periodically, and were generally well above world prices. This system of support was a major target for the exporters in the Uruguay Round.

The high level of target prices relative to world prices over much of the past thirty years has tended to isolate the EU internal market. With such a controlled market, the need for internal subsidies was minimal. Domestic (taxpayer funded) subsidies were the exception rather than the rule, being limited to products of mainly regional importance such as durum wheat and olive oil, to livestock grants paid to hill farmers, and to the crushers of EU-grown oilseeds, a contentious scheme that provoked a trade dispute with the US.

The reforms in the past twenty years have changed the relationship between the CAP and the trade policy environment in which EU agriculture exists. These reforms reduced the reliance on intervention and the subsequent subsidizing of exports in the cereals market by cutting the domestic support price. The reduction of cereal prices and the consequent decline in the need for export subsidies allowed the EU to agree to restrictions on export subsidies in the GATT Uruguay Round, as embedded in the URAA.

Domestic subsidies were also constrained in the URAA, in particular those that were deemed to be most trade distorting. The extent to which these direct payments, related to past output and tied to quantitative restraints, should be disciplined was a major topic for negotiation at the Blair House meeting of November 1992, at which the EU and the US agreed on the main parameters of the URAA. The device of the Blue Box was introduced at that time as a way of placing the MacSharry compensation payments (and the US deficiency payments) in a category separate from the most trade distorting subsidies (as measured by the Aggregate Measure of Support (AMS)). The Blue Box payments were not subject to reductions, though they had to be limited (for crops, to a fixed area and yield, or paid on 85 percent or less of a base level of production) and support was not to exceed the 1992 levels. Thus the Blue Box represented the way in which the reformed CAP became consistent with the Uruguay Round constraints. The notifications by the EU to the WTO reflect this compromise, and provide the starting point for an analysis of the impact of the Revised Draft Modalities of the Doha Development Agenda.

By contrast, the level of border support, through tariffs and export subsidies, has been reduced by a lesser amount. Hence the exporters of farm goods still consider the EU market to be restricted, and still object to the use of export subsidies to clear the market. In this regard, the EU has to complement its domestic reforms with significant changes in market access. In addition, other countries would not consider a Doha Round that left export subsidies intact to be satisfactory.

2. EU Negotiating Position

The domestic policy reforms have shaped the EU's negotiating position in the DDA. Relative to the US and the G-20, the EU has argued for a slower opening of markets, but has agreed to the elimination of export subsidies and a steep reduction of domestic support caps. The EU has also emphasized the importance of flexibility in the case of sensitive products.

The EU tabled a market access offer including tariff cuts and a somewhat high tariff cap (100 percent), but wanted exceptions for more "sensitive products" that did the exporters.

The EU has agreed to end its export subsidies but only if other export programs used by US and Canada are curbed. The EU has laid out plans for a significant cut in its own domestic support limits, and has indicated that it expects the US to make real cuts in its own support.

Negotiations have been ongoing in the Council for Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS Council), as mandated in the Uruguay Round, on the establishment of a multilateral register for wines and spirits. The EU has insisted on a link between these talks and the agricultural negotiations, and has indicated that it needs some concessions in this area before agreeing to a broader deal. The US, Australia and Canada are, however, opposed to the concept of a mandatory register but willing to agree to a voluntary list of GIs that countries can refer to when setting domestic regulations.

Discussions have stalled on the other GI issue of interest to the EU, that of extending to other food products the “enhanced” protection given to wines and spirits in the TRIPS agreement. There is no agreement whether indeed these talks are mandated by the Doha Agenda. In this case, some developing countries have supported the EU in arguing for such an extension of protection. The Framework Agreement and the Chairman’s Revised Draft are silent on the resolution to this problem.

In summary, the conditions for a package acceptable to the EU are now fairly clear, though the willingness of countries to agree to them is still elusive. These conditions include:

- **Market Access:** substantial improvements in access to developed and emerging markets are needed in order for European governments to retain domestic support for the deal. EU will need to reduce demands for wide sensitive product exclusion from tariff cuts. This might entail substantial market opening through TRQ expansion.
- **Domestic support:** real cuts in domestic support by the US and EU are required that have to be credible to developing countries. Ceilings must be lower than historical levels to avoid increases in domestic support in the future. The EU can satisfy this condition more easily than the US (see below).
- **Export subsidies:** all forms of export aids need to be eliminated in parallel, as conditionally agreed. The EU has put its own export subsidies “on the table” and the prospect of losing this concession is a significant pressure on other countries to complete a deal.
- **Balancing issues:** some progress will be needed in other areas, such as GIs, in order to “sweeten the pot” for those who would otherwise be seen to make the largest concessions. By the same token, a new Peace Clause could be necessary as a part of a final package to convince domestic politicians that policies will not be subject to endless legal challenge.

In addition, the EU is seeking an equal level of “ambition” in other areas of the talks, particularly Non Agricultural Market Access (NAMA) and Services, so that a broad package can be put together that all Member States can support.

3. Domestic Support

Notifications

The first notification of domestic support by the EU, in 1995/96, coincided with the final years of the implementation of the MacSharry reforms.³ Direct payments (the area payments on cereals and oilseeds, and the headage payments on beef and sheep) were placed in the Blue Box, as they were associated with limits on production. As a result, the original notifications, from the 1995/96 marketing year, included a large AMS component (48 billion euro) and smaller but sizable Blue Box element (21 billion euro) and a relatively modest amount of Green Box payments (19 billion euro).⁴

The EU last notified its level of domestic support in December 2006. The period covered support up to the 2003/04 marketing year. Figure 1 shows the notifications from 1995/6 to 2003/04. The nature of the CAP reforms since 1995 is reflected in the notifications of domestic support to the WTO. The changes in policy show up as a major shift in the pattern of the notification among the different categories of domestic support. Support prices have been reduced for most of the major products, to close somewhat the gap between EU prices and those in world markets. Export subsidies have also been reduced in part as a result of the WTO constraints.

The “new” CAP, starting with the MacSharry reforms, places heavy reliance on direct payments to farmers based on past production patterns and broadly unrelated to current prices and output decisions. Thus the nine notifications from 1995/96 to 2003/04 show a marked reduction in price supports compensated by an increase in direct payments. Current Total AMS payments fell from around 50 billion euro in 1995/96 to 30 billion euro in 2003/04, a 40 percent decline. Blue Box payments rose over the period, from 20 billion to 25 billion euro, and Green Box payments rose from 18 billion to 22 billion euro.⁵

The mix of policies in the EU changed relatively little from 1995 to 2000, as the reforms in the cereal and oilseed sectors were being assimilated. But budget pressures and the prospect of ten new members from eastern and central Europe led the EU to consider further reforms. These were incorporated in a decision known as the Agenda 2000 reforms that were agreed in 1999. These reforms had a noticeable impact on the EU domestic support notifications, maintaining the direction of the 1992 reforms but pushing somewhat further. Intervention prices were reduced by 29 percent for cereals (including a more substantial cut for rice) and, from 2005, they were to be reduced by 15 percent for

³ The compensation payments were introduced progressively in the marketing years 1993/94 – 1995/96.

⁴ No estimate exists of what would have been the AMS notifications before 1995, had they been required. But it is likely that, in the eight years between the 1986-88 base and the first year of the URAA, trade-distorting support (as measured by the AMS) fell from about 80 billion to 50 billion euro. This was due in large part to the introduction of the MacSharry reforms and the placing of these payments in the Blue Box. Green Box eligible policies probably rose modestly over the same period.

⁵ Though this might appear to suggest that about 10 billion euro in less trade-distorting support has replaced 20 billion euro of more trade-disruptive payments, it should be remembered that the much of the AMS is a calculation based on the difference between an administered price and a fixed reference price. So a drop in this support can be unrelated to either government payments or farm income.

butter and for skimmed milk powder, reducing the gap between these “administered” prices and the fixed reference prices.⁶ The AMS fell from 48 billion euro in 1999/2000 to 29 billion euro in 2002/03. Changes in the beef regime also modified the notifications somewhat: to the existing subsidies for suckler cows and the special beef premium was added a slaughter premium and some supplementary payments, notified as Blue Box payments as they were limited to base levels of livestock numbers. Blue Box payments increased by 5 billion euros over this period.

Even more significant in their impact on the EU’s domestic support notification have been the reforms enacted since that time, notably the 2003 Fischler Reforms, the changes in the regime for the Mediterranean crops in 2004, the reform of the sugar policy in 2005, and the reform of the fresh and processed fruit and vegetable policies in 2007. The introduction of a Single Farm Payment, the key ingredient of the 2003 Reform, further separates payments from current production. An estimate of the notifications for the years 2004/05 to 2006/07 are included in Figure 1.⁷ The 2004/05 notification of domestic support will include some of these decoupled payments under the Fischler reforms, those that were made in 2004, but the main impact will be on the notifications from 2005/06 and 2006/2007, by which time many of the policy changes will have been implemented.

The result of these reforms is that a significant shift from Blue Box to Green Box is likely to occur in the next few notifications, as the Blue Box could be reduced to about 4 billion euro in 2006/07 from about 25 billion euro in the most recent notification, and the Green Box could expand from 22 billion euro to 38 billion over the same period (see Table 1). A significant further reduction could occur in the AMS, from 31 billion euros to 21 billion euros between 2003 and 2006, reflecting the changes in policy, as many payments that were previously linked to production are shifted to the Green Box. By 2006/07 the transformation of the CAP into a predominantly Green Box policy will be well underway, with a further increase in decoupled direct payments and a reduction of those in the Blue Box and the Product-Specific AMS (Blandford and Josling, 2007; Josling and Swinbank, forthcoming).

In the URAA limits were put on trade-distorting domestic support. In particular, the Current Total AMS had to be within a ceiling given by the 1986-88 base level reduced over six years by 20 percent. The base period AMS as calculated by the EU (and agreed by other countries) was to be reduced by the year 2000 to 67.2 billion euro.⁸ These

⁶ The Agenda 2000 package also agreed a new dairy premium from 2005, to compensate dairy farmers for the scheduled reductions in butter and skim milk powder intervention prices. In G/AG/N/EEC/17 the EU said it intended declaring these payments in the Blue Box.

⁷ For the details behind these forecasts see Josling and Swinbank (2008).

⁸ The EU (at that time the EU12) declared a base period AMS of 73.53 billion euro, which with a 20% reduction would have given an AMS commitment in 2000 equal to 58.82 billion euro. However, a ‘credit’ of 2.38 billion euro was negotiated, and this led to a Final Bound Total AMS of 61.20 billion euro being agreed (see Supporting Table 9a in the EU notification). Enlargement to the EU15 necessitated some changes. The initial AMS figure of 78.7 billion euro mentioned in the text was the EU15 limit in the first year of implementation. The revised Final Bound Total AMS was fixed at 67.2 billion euro for the EU15. No limit has been agreed for the EU of 25 or of 27: for the purposes of this paper we will assume that the EU15 limit is continued.

commitments continue until a revised set of limits is agreed, as would be the case if the Doha Round arrived at a conclusion.

The EU is well within the limits set by the Agreement on Agriculture, in part because of the high AMS recorded in the base period and in part as a result of the steady progress of reform, moving away from price support toward direct payments. Figure 1 shows the Current Total AMS in relation to the negotiated AMS limit. In the latest official notification, the AMS stood at 30.9 billion euro, and our estimated notification for the year 2006/07 shows the level at 21.2 billion euro. Projected notifications for the years beyond 2006/07 indicate that one can expect the level of AMS payments to drop to about 20 billion euro with the full impact of the CAP reform, and to be stable after 2009 (Josling and Swinbank, forthcoming). This situation gives the EU considerable scope for agreeing to reductions in the ceiling for the AMS as a part of a Doha Round agreement.

The Revised Draft Modalities for Domestic Support

WTO members are at present considering a number of changes to the URAA that would have an impact on the constraints on EU policy from WTO obligations. In February 2008 Ambassador Crawford Falconer, the chair of the Special Session of the WTO Committee on Agriculture, released a revised set of draft modalities for agriculture that included detailed proposals for future disciplines on domestic support (TN/AG/W/4/Rev.1). The Falconer revised draft modalities paper was an attempt to frame the parameters of such increased restraint so as to enable countries to converge on a single document. The EU has indicated that it would be willing to accept a conclusion within the range of the Falconer draft, provided that other countries respond with satisfactory offers in other areas.

The Falconer proposals, as they would apply to the EU, are summarized in Table 2. The proposals would place a limit on overall trade-distorting support (OTDS). The base period OTDS would comprise the Final Bound Total AMS, ten percent of the 1995-2000 value of agricultural production (the current *de minimis* allowances), and the higher of the average Blue Box payments and 5 percent of the value of agricultural production in the base period. This OTDS limit would be subject to reductions over the implementation period of the agreement. There would also be reductions in the limits for the total AMS from the final values applying under the Uruguay Round Agreement as well as in the *de minimis* percentages. The Blue Box would have limits imposed based on the percentage of the value of production. Limits would also be imposed on the product-specific AMS and on product-specific Blue Box support, as described in the table.

The implications for the EU of these proposals are summarized in Tables 3 and 4. The Base OTDS, from which reductions would be measured, would be 110.3 billion euro. Thus the range for the Final Bound OTDS would be from 16.5 to 27.6 billion euro. This corresponds to an estimate of 24 billion euro for the Current Total OTDS in the year 2013/14.⁹ Thus the more restrictive limit would appear to bind and impose further policy

⁹ In order to examine the impact of these changes on future notifications we assume that new WTO support commitments are implemented over the period from 2010-2014, so that all new reductions and bindings apply fully in 2014. Our assumptions about the evolution of agricultural policy in the EU are that

changes of a nature consistent with developments since 2003. The overall picture is shown in Figure 2, which shows the projected notifications relative to the more ambitious limits in the range indicated in the Draft Modalities Paper. The AMS limit would be reduced from the current level of 67.2 billion euro to 20.1 billion euro (augmented minimally by allowance for the enlargement of the EU).¹⁰ The estimated Current Total AMS for the year 2013/14 is 24.0 billion euro, indicating a significant restraint on EU policies in the final year of the transition period if they continue on their current course. The year 2013/14 is the year when a new budgetary cycle starts in the EU at which time the funding for the CAP could well be trimmed for internal reasons.

In addition to the constraints on total AMS and Blue Box support, the Revised Modalities Draft also proposes restrictions on product-specific AMS and Blue Box amounts (see Table 2 for details). The implications of these restrictions are shown in Table 6 (for the AMS limits) and Table 7 (for the Blue Box limits). These constraints might well be binding in specific instances. The Revised Draft suggests caps on product specific AMS payments at the 1995-2000 levels. Increases in administered prices are effectively restricted by this constraint. Changes in fixed reference prices are not envisaged in the URAA, and would presumably have to be negotiated. But variations in the level of “eligible production” for both the products where the market price support is calculated and for those where an equivalent measure of support is used could well lead to AMS limits being violated.

Blue box limits at a product specific level are also likely to have some impact. Though the total Blue Box spending may be decreasing, as payments move to the Green Box, those for individual products cannot increase to make use of that “slack”. Although these payments are currently tied to fixed yield, areas and head of livestock, the restriction implies no possibility of any re-basing of such payments that would violate the limits.

Although it would appear that the EU can continue to run the CAP for some years in the face of cuts of 70 percent for the AMS limit and the introduction of a cut of 85 percent in overall trade-distorting support, these results should not be interpreted as an indication that the WTO constraints introduced by the Doha Round will not ultimately affect EU policy. In order to stay within the new limits, changes would have to be made to ensure that direct payments can continue to be notified as Green Box without being challenged by other countries. And further transfers of subsidies from the blue to the green box will be necessary.

The extent to which the SPS are truly compatible with the Green Box has been raised by some commentators. (Swinbank and Tranter, 2005, and Swinbank, 2007). Were they to be notified in the AMS or Blue Box, under current WTO constraints, the impact would not be great. The limit of 67.2 billion euro for the AMS would not be approached, and the

progressively more of the direct payments can be notified as Green Box, as the “Health Check” solidifies the changes in the 2003 Reforms.

¹⁰ The limit for the OTDS at the end of the transition period appears to be less than the AMS limit (a function of the higher percentage cut), implying that the AMS will have to be reduced by even more than indicated here to avoid violation of the OTDS limit. There will in effect be no room for blue box and *de minimis* payments by the end of the transition.

Blue Box is not limited.¹¹ However, the situation would be drastically changed if the Doha Round were to be completed along the lines of the Revised Modalities. In all cases except where the direct payments are notified in the Green Box (where no limit exists) the new WTO constraints would be violated by the year 2013/14. If direct payments were to be notified in the Blue Box, the total would far exceed the limit of 5.6 billion euro suggested in the Revised Draft. Up to 28 billion euro would have to be notified in the AMS and this would well exceed the limit of 20.1 billion euro suggested in the same draft. *A fortiori*, if all the direct payments were to be notified in the AMS, the limit of 20.1 billion euro would again be violated. Perhaps more relevant is the effect on the OTDS of any decision to place direct payments outside the Green Box. The OTDS limit of 16.5 billion euro suggested by the Draft would be less than the level of direct payments alone, leaving all other support to be cut or changed to Green Box compatible payments.¹²

IV. Market Access

Market access liberalization in the European Union is among the stumbling blocks of the whole Doha Round negotiation. The size of the European market (the largest for developing countries), combined with a significant level of initial border protection, explains its special interest for trading partners. Meanwhile, market access liberalization faces harsh resistances in the EU. The principle of intervention prices, aimed at maintaining domestic prices above a given level, is still key to the EU's Common Agricultural Policy, even though its importance has been considerably reduced by successive reforms. Such interventions require border protection to be maintained above the level corresponding to the gap between world and domestic prices. Liberalizing border protection would thus not only increase, in some cases dramatically, the extent of foreign competition faced by European farmers, it would also put into question the nature and scope of agricultural policies.

European border protection is highly uneven across products, and serious concerns focus on a handful of sectors. Given the different importance of agriculture and agrofood industries across member countries, as well as the different sectoral specialization, market access liberalization is also a source of internal conflicts in the EU. Countries with still large and relatively powerful agricultural sectors, like France, Spain or Poland, have repeatedly expressed their opposition to liberalizing above the initial European proposal whose ambition lies far below the revised draft modalities. Other member countries, like the UK, Germany or the Netherlands, see in agricultural market access liberalization a powerful leverage to obtain further concessions from their partners on issues like non-agricultural market access and services, where offensive interests clearly dominate for the EU.

¹¹ Inclusion in the Blue Box of new or modified subsidies however could be challenged, but these subsidies could be transferred to the AMS without violating the AMS limit. The AMS limit itself will be somewhat higher than 67.2 billion euro, to take into account the allowable limits of new members.

¹² However, another source of uncertainty is less of a problem in the EU. Unlike the situation in the U.S., relatively little of the support provided to farmers in the EU is subject to increases if market prices fall.

The existence of numerous and widespread preferential trade agreements complicates further the problem. Countries benefiting from bilateral agreements (including recently signed or still negotiated Economic Partnership Agreements), from the GSP+ or from the Everything But Arms initiative, face little protection in acceding the European market; their main concern lies in the erosion of their preferential margin. Non-European developed countries and developing countries in East Asia and Latin America, in contrast, consider EU border protection and preferential access as a major obstacle to the development of their agricultural and agro-food exports.

The situation is evolving, however. By reducing the scope and depth of price support, successive reforms have reduced the intensity of the problems potentially posed by market access liberalization. Unfavorable rulings in WTO panel against EU's policies on banana and sugar have required further reforms for these two products, among the most sensitive. And lastly, the recent surge in world prices of many agricultural products has potentially opened new room for manoeuvre.

EU agricultural border protection is complex, and the revised draft modalities include a number of different (and not always simply applied) provisions. The assessment proposed here mainly aims at making clear what the actual consequences of the modalities might be for market access in the EU.

EU's current agricultural tariffs

Before asking what the impact of liberalization could be, assessing in detail the starting point is in order. In so doing, we take 2004 as the reference year and use the WTO rule to compute the ad-valorem equivalent (AVE) of specific tariffs (TN/MA/20). Even though no agreement has been reached so far on the computation of AVEs for the sugar sector, we use the general rule for this sector.

Summarizing protection requires choosing a weighting scheme. Much has been written on this important issue, and using theoretically sound aggregators is beyond the reach of this paper. Unless otherwise specified, we will use in what follows import-weighted averages. Such computations are widely used, and provide useful information, in particular as far as market access is concerned (Anderson and Neary, 2007). Still, they are also known to suffer from an endogeneity bias: imports tend to be lower on highly protected products –and zero for prohibitive tariffs–, inducing an understatement of the true extent of protection. But import-weighted averages are also sensitive to the presence of tariff rate quotas (TRQs). This protection instrument typically allows substantial imports in highly protected sectors; when only the outside-quota tariff rate is accounted for, as is the case here, this leads to an upward bias in the average.

We use in some cases as additional information the un-weighted average across tariff lines. This metric is easily calculated and widely used, but it does not account for the relative trade importance of tariff lines. This is why we also report in this section averages weighted by exports of WTO trading partners as a group, toward a reference group of industrialised importers ("reference-group weighted averages", see Bouët et al., 2008 for details). Such calculation limits the extent of the endogeneity bias, while taking into account the respective importance of tariff lines in terms of potential imports.

Unless otherwise specified, calculations are based in what follows on data from the TARIC, the Integrated Community Tariff database, harmonized at the HS6 level following the MAcMapHS6 methodology (Bouët et al., 2008). Even though EU tariff schedule is defined using an eight digit nomenclature and applied at the ten digit level (with four additional codes), working at the six digit level facilitates cross-country comparisons. Moreover, in spite of the desire to promote transparency in the WTO negotiations, several key elements needed in order to perform detailed analysis at the tariff line level are still restricted to negotiators, for instance the mapping table between Uruguay Round schedule nomenclature and the current applied tariff schedule or the official AVEs computed by each delegation. While 2004 is used as a base year, the data is updated to consider the consequences of the poultry cases initiated by Brazil and Thailand (WT/DS269 and WT/DS286) in 2003 against the EU, which induced the EU to increase its bound tariffs for several tariff lines in 2006.

The average bound duty for agricultural products in the EU was 22.9% in 2004 when weighted by imports, and 23.4% un-weighted (Table 7). Weighted by reference group exports, the average amounts to 29.5%. This protection is markedly heterogeneous, as reflected in the import-weighted standard deviation of 42%. High protection is largely clustered in a handful of chapters, in particular sugar (chapter 17, import-weighted average bound duty of 129%), cereals (chapter 10, 78.4%), meat and edible meat offal (chapter 2, 67.5%), dairy produce (chapter 4, 55.9%) and products of the milling industry (chapter 11, 44.4%). In each case, these high levels of protection mainly result from specific duties. For fruits and vegetables, seasonal tariffs and entry prices increase the difficulty of computing *ad valorem* tariff with precision; we cannot exclude the possibility that protection in the corresponding chapters (7 and 8) is underestimated in our calculations.

In contrast, bound protection is zero in textiles of agricultural origin (agricultural products in chapters 41, 43, 50, 51, 52 and 53), in vegetable plaiting materials (chapter 14), in "other products of animal origin" (chapter 5), and it is less than 5% in a few other chapters, including important tropical products (cocoa, coffee, tea), as well as oil seeds and oleaginous fruits (chapter 12).

Little difference remained between EU's bound and applied MFN duties after the Uruguay Round. Still, the seasonality of protection in vegetables, fruits and cereals is a source of significant binding overhang (4.4% for vegetables, 6.0% for fruits, and 3.5% for preparations thereof). Last, the unilateral liberalization of applied MFN duties for wheat, except barley, has created an additional, important source of binding overhang, averaging to 42.8% for the chapter.¹³

In practice, the border protection level applied by the EU differs significantly from the MFN duties described so far, due to the large number of reciprocal and non-reciprocal preferential trade agreements signed by the EU. As a result, the trade-weighted average

¹³ In addition, EU tariffs on cereals include discrimination based on the entry point in Europe. For example, the same product, on a specific day, will face a different tariff if it enters by trains (land) or by boat (sea), going through the Suez channel or not.

of preferential duties was 16.2% in 2004, when only the outside-quota tariff rate is taken into account for TRQ products.¹⁴

Assessing the tariff-cutting impact of the formula

The revised draft modalities include a number of complementary provisions for liberalizing market access. In this section, we focus first on the core element of these modalities, the tariff-cutting formula, and then consider the specific suggestions associated with sensitive products or TRQs.

As a preamble to assessing the impact of the revised draft modalities, it is also useful to examine how tariff lines are spread across the bands upon which the tariff cutting formula is based. Among the 2204 eight-digit level agricultural tariff lines in the EU, 1569 exhibit an AVE bound duty less than or equal to 20% (i.e. are not dutiable or pertain to the first band –see Table 8). 352 tariff lines belong to the second band (AVE between 20 and 50%), 134 to the third band (50 to 75%), and 149 to the fourth band (above 75%). Not surprisingly, the bulk of tariff lines in the last two bands are clustered in the above-mentioned high-protection sectors. The importance of cattle products is especially noteworthy, with chapters 1, 2 and 4 jointly accounting for almost two-thirds the number of tariff lines in the fourth band, and more than half the tariff lines in the third band. A significant number of products belonging to these two bands are also found in cereals and the milling industry (chapters 10 and 11), in the sugar sector (chapter 17), in preparation of fruits and vegetables (chapter 20) and in residues and waste of the food industry¹⁵ (chapter 23).

The percentage cuts involved in the proposed tiered formula are still being negotiated, as reflected in the bracketed numbers in the text. In each case, we use as a proxy the mean of the two bracketed numbers. The tiered formula used here thus entails cutting by 50% bound duties with AVE below 20%, by 57.5% duties between 20% and 50%, by 63.5% duties between 50 and 75%, and by 69.5% duties with AVE above 75%. As before, the calculations rest on the agreed computation of AVEs of specific tariffs, extended to the sugar sector. For TRQ products, only the over-quota tariff rate is accounted for.

Applying without any exception the core tiered formula to the EU would cut its (import-weighted) average bound duty from 22.9% down to 8.5% –see Table 9 (the final bound duty would be 8.9% in un-weighted average, and 10.8% in a reference-group weighted average). This would represent a 63% cut in the average bound duty, whatever weighting scheme is used. This relative cut is almost identical to the one found in Blandford, Laborde and Martin (2008) for the US, although the absolute cut (from 7.9% to 3.5%) is far lower in that case. As is logical for such a progressive formula, the cut in the average bound duty would be even higher for highly protected sectors such as sugar (-68%), food residues (-68%), cereals (-67%), meat (-66%) or dairy produce (-64%). The standard

¹⁴ Computing the AVE of a TRQ is cumbersome, since it is often difficult to know to what extent the quota is actually binding, and who benefited from the corresponding rent. According to our calculations, accounting for inside-quota tariff rates would lower the average duty by only 0.9 percentage points.

¹⁵ Protection is high for some products in this sector because it includes downstream products, or byproducts, of highly protected industries such as cereals, sugar or meat.

deviation of bound duties across products would accordingly fall by a factor of three, from 42% down to 14%, i.e. by more than the average. After such tariff cuts, the highest sectoral average bound duties would be found in the sugar sector (41.2%), cereals (26.2%), meat (23.0%) and dairy produce (20.1%).

As part of the special and differential treatment granted to developing countries, additional provisions are proposed to ensure "fullest liberalization of trade in tropical and diversification products", by requiring larger cuts for these products (Revised Modalities, § 140-141). Since the corresponding list of products concerned is still being negotiated, we base our assessment of these provisions on the Uruguay Round's list of tropical products. These provisions are found to reduce the average bound duty by an additional 0.6 percentage point, down to 7.9 percent. At the HS chapter level, their impact is mainly significant on products of the milling industry, oils and fats, fruits and their preparations, and cocoa.

In order to gain a comprehensive appreciation of the potential impact of the tariff-cutting formula, provisions aimed at addressing tariff escalation (§ 80-86) must be taken into account. We find that these provisions have little impact here: the only chapter significantly impacted is food residues (-1.3 percentage points), and the average bound duty is further reduced by 0.2 percentage point only. Outside this sector, tariff escalation is actually not widespread in the EU, even though many processing industries benefit from domestic support through input subsidies instead of border protection (cf. tomato based products, until recently subsidized butter for cookies industries), allowing them to remain competitive on the world market despite high domestic prices on some inputs. The limited effect of tariff escalation provisions is also related to the restrictive coverage of the draft modalities list, which for instance excludes orange juice and chocolate products.

While this does not show up in the calculations, the provisions concerning tariff simplification (§ 98-104) would also entail substantial changes in European protection since the highest protection levels generally result from specific duties, or from the specific component of complex duties. This provision will change MFN bound and applied tariffs but also the GSP scheme since, in the EU, GSP preferences for sensitive products are mainly granted through the elimination of the *ad valorem* component of compound tariffs. Moreover, it is noteworthy that protection in the fruits and vegetables sectors involves a large number of complex tariffs, often including provisions linked to the entry price of imports. The AVE of such tariffs is difficult to compute, and it remains unclear at this point how they may be adapted to comply with the proposed modalities.

Given the extent of trade preferences in the EU market, the implications of the formula for applied duties are worth investigating, in order to evaluate how changes in bound duties are actually transmitted to applied preferential duties, and what the implications are in terms of preferential margins. This assessment should be interpreted with caution, though, insofar as it is unclear how applied duties may be adapted to liberalized bound duties. We make here the conservative assumption that applied duties are set at their initial level or at the new bound duty level, whichever is lower. Another issue is the market access conditions available to ACP countries (still negotiating Economic Partnership Agreements for many of them) when the formula is applied. The conditions

prevailing in 2004 are taken here as a basis (except for EBA, the implementation of which is assumed to be completed).

Our calculations show that the average applied preferential duty would be cut by approximately the same proportion as bound duties, from 16.2% down to 6.2% (Table 10). Since applied duties are weighted by bilateral imports instead of total imports from WTO partners, however, this result is difficult to interpret in terms of preferential margin.

We therefore compute average preferential margins as the difference between MFN applied duties and the lowest preferential tariff the exporter is eligible to, weighted by total imports from WTO partners. This calculation shows that the average preferential margin, initially equal to 3.5 percentage points, is reduced to 1.0 percentage points, i.e. by approximately three quarters. This is substantially more than the average percentage cut, illustrating the reality of preference erosion. This is no surprise, and the provisions concerning long-standing preferences and preference erosion (§ 142-144) are largely meant to address the problems posed by the erosion of European preferences, in particular with regards to ACP countries. Averaging across all partners as is done here for the sake of consistency and brevity makes it difficult to assess the issue in detail, but sugar appears as the chapter where the problem is by far most acute; the erosion of preferential margins is also significant for fruits and vegetables (with the outstanding issue of bananas), for cereal products and for tobacco. Preferential margins are cut for developing countries as a whole (Table 11). In absolute terms, the cut is especially large for LDCs: from an initial 19.3 points, the margins falls to 6.2 points when the formula is applied to all products, and to 9.5 points when sensitive products exemptions are taken into account. In contrast, countries only eligible to the GSP should face far less preference erosion, especially for those most concern with graduation from this program, as may be Brazil or Argentina.

Sensitive products: likely selection and consequences

Sensitive products are increasingly considered as one of the focal points of the Doha Round negotiation. This is especially true for the EU, where the unevenness of border protection and potential conflicts with price support in some sectors make this issue important from the point of view of both European farmers and trading partners.

The selection of sensitive products is constrained by a set of specific rules, but left to the discretion of policy makers. Guessing which products may be selected as sensitive is therefore inevitably hazardous. Nevertheless, the elaboration of trade policy has already been scrutinized in depth in the literature, allowing well-grounded simulations to be made.

We assume that sensitive products are selected according to the political economy criterion described in Jean, Laborde and Martin (2008). This criterion is based on the assumption that the political economy motivations that led to the present trade policy pattern are still valid: in this context, the political economy benefit of selecting a given product as sensitive can be shown to be proportional to the squared initial applied tariff, to the squared proportional cut implied by the formula, and to the level of imports. Those products for which this political economy benefit is highest are therefore suggested as most likely to be selected as sensitive.

The allowed number of sensitive products is still being negotiated. The calculations presented here are based on the assumption that 5% of tariff lines can be treated as sensitive, and that they are allowed two-third the cut entailed by the formula (one third and one half are also considered in the revised modalities, with corresponding different options for compensation through TRQs). The analysis is carried out at the HS6 level, which entails significant simplification compared to the tariff line level at which the EU's lists should actually be established.

The results of this systematic procedure must be considered with caution. They should be thought of as a best guess based on trade and protection information, but the calculation does not account for cross-product specific relationships (complementarity between co-products, substitutability between differentiated products, etc.) nor for interactions with domestic support policies, which may also influence the choice.

Table 12 shows the fifteen HS6 products coming up as most likely to be treated as sensitive by the EU. This indicative list includes products widely recognized as sensitive, such as sugar, bananas and bovine meat or dairy produce. The list also features other meats (sheep, fowl), vegetables (manioc, garlic) and cereals and related products (maize residuals, rice, residues of starch).

A broader analysis by chapter confirms that meat and meat products (chapter 2), dairy produce (chapter 4), cereals (chapter 10), food residues (chapter 23) and sugar (chapter 17) are the most likely to be concerned with sensitive products exemptions, together with olive oil in chapter 15.

The impact of sensitive product exemptions on average protection is summarized in Table 13. According to our calculation, the 5% tariff lines selected as sensitive account for 18% of EU imports. Based on the formula including provisions for tropical products and tariff escalation, the corresponding flexibility reduces the cut in the import-weighted average bound duty from 66% to 51%. From 7.7% without flexibility, the final average is enhanced to 11.2%. The difference is significantly larger than for the US, where MFN protection ends up averaging 4.1% when sensitive product exemptions are accounting for, as compared to 3.3% when the formula is fully applied to all products (Blandford, Laborde and Martin, 2008).

However, import-weighted averages are somewhat misleading for sensitive products, because most of them are covered by TRQs. In this case, the duty is assumed to be equal to the (often very high) outside-quota tariff rate, and imports are frequently large. Protection in these products is thus arguably over-weighted in this calculation, which does not account for the lower protection faced by in-quota imports. As a matter of fact, un-weighted calculations provide a less dramatic picture about the impact of sensitive product exemption: from 64%, the proportional cut is found in this case to be reduced to 59%. This corresponds to a final average tariff level of 9.5%, instead of 8.4% without sensitive product exemptions.

It may be argued that these un-weighted calculation in turn underweight sensitive products, since policy makers have incentives to designate as sensitive products with above-average trade importance, insofar as restrictions are only expressed in terms of number of tariff lines. The bottom line is that these two calculations can be considered as lower and upper bounds of the impact of sensitive products. The un-weighted cut in the

average bound duty (60%) also shows that, accounting for sensitive products treatment (under the assumption that two-third the formula cut is applied to them), the EU would not be constrained by the 54% minimum threshold set in the modalities. Meat, sugar, cereals and their by-products in chapter 23 are the sectors most strongly impacted by sensitive product exemptions.

In any case, this lesser liberalization should be accompanied by significant TRQ creations or expansions. This clause may influence significantly the choice of sensitive products, and the actual market access impact of implied deviations from tariff-cutting formula. These TRQ creations are difficult to assess, notably because they should be set in proportion of domestic consumption, about which figures are not always available at the same level as trade and protection information. Still, an illustrative calculation is possible for some products. Based on the assumption that TRQ creation should amount to 4% of domestic consumption (or 3% when the initial TRQ is large enough, consistently with the application of two-third the formula cut), the corresponding assessments are reported in column 5 of Table 12. TRQ creations would vary largely across products, and they are found to amount to one fifth or more of initial imports in half of the cases.

Tariffs facing EU Exporters

Even though access to the EU market is the most heated issue, agricultural market access liberalization will also mean for EU's producers enhanced access to export markets. On average, the implementation of the full formula would reduce applied tariffs faced by EU exporters by 36%, from 18.2% to 11.7% (Table 14). Applying the complete formula would originate substantial gains for European exporters in other OECD markets, where the average applied cut would reach 53%. As is logical given the special and differential treatment, the gains in developing countries (excluding SVEs, RAMs and LDCs) would be more modest, with the average tariff faced cut by one-fifth.

These gains must be revised downward when flexibilities for sensitive and special products are accounted for. The global average cut is then reduced by one-third, with *in fine* an average rate faced of 14.2%; this would represent a cut in average duty faced by 22%. In this case, developed markets would reduce their barriers towards EU exporters by 36%. This is significantly less than the 53% mentioned above, but it is certainly more than during the Uruguay Round, since at that time dirty tariffication ended up in keeping applied protection nearly unchanged.

How provisions concerning special products would be applied for developing countries is difficult to determine. Absent any better selection rule, we assume here that they are selected by policy makers following the same criteria as sensitive products. In this case, the combination of sensitive and special products for developing countries is found to neutralize much of the tariff reduction on products of interests for the EU exporters, with an average rate of reduction falling to 7% in these markets. This reflects the fact that the cumulation of sensitive and special product exemption grant developing countries with significant flexibility in applying the liberalization modalities. While protection faced by EU exporters was initially similar on average across developed and developing markets (0.2% of difference), the gap would rise up to 5.7%.

Table 15 provides sectoral information regarding EU offensive interests. Export opportunities should arise in meat industries, beverages, vegetables and live trees sectors. Flexibilities for sensitive and special products would strongly reduce potential gains in meat, beverages and cereals, and appear critical for EU dairy exporters where the expected market access gain fall from 7 percentage points as a result of a full application of the formula, to 3.1 points with flexibilities. In practice, however, the evolution of each productive sector will reflect the new market equilibrium emerging as a result of the reform, which is far more complex to devise. Beyond the aspects mentioned so far, it will also depend in some sectors upon the removal of export subsidies.

V. Export Competition

The EU is the major user of direct export subsidies, accounting for about 90 percent of such subsidies over the period since 1995.¹⁶ The level of subsidies by product is shown in Table 16, for the year 2002/03 – the latest year for which an export subsidy notification has been made by the EU. Major beneficiaries of export subsidies are the grains, dairy products, beef and poultry, sugar, wine and fruits and vegetables. Though high quality products in these categories find ready markets, subsidies help to clear domestic supplies and maintain domestic prices. Products where the quantity exported with a subsidy has been close to the agreed limit have included butter and other dairy products, rice, poultry, alcohol (from agricultural raw materials) and products that incorporate higher-priced domestic inputs such as sugar. Quantities of cereals and sugar are donated as food aid, also reported to the WTO along with export subsidies.

Other exporters support export sales by means of subsidized credit, food aid that is designed to dispose of unwanted surpluses and develop markets for later commercial sales, or privileged treatment of single-desk exporting parastatals by the government. The EU has consistently taken the view that it is willing to eliminate direct export subsidies if other exporters cut in parallel these other forms of export assistance. The Framework agreement of July 2004 included such a commitment and the date of 2013 was agreed at the Hong Kong Ministerial. The Revised Modalities draft elaborates these agreements and sets out a timetable for the reduction and elimination of direct export subsidies as well as the parallel elimination of other forms of subsidy to exports. These provisions are summarized in Table 17, below.

The constraints on the other forms of export subsidies have been one of the main requests by the EU: parallelism in improving export competition is the necessary condition for export subsidy elimination. The EU has argued for self-financing rules for export credit guarantees, for the elimination of the single-desk selling parastatals, and for the move toward cash-based, untied food aid. The Revised Draft has captured this parallelism in a way that should allow the EU to sell the loss of export subsidies to domestic constituents. Indeed, this is one area where the EU has played the unfamiliar role of “demandeur” in the agricultural talks: the food aid rules in particular fit in well with both current practice and desired developments as seen by the EU. It is the US that will have to change its food aid policies, and remove a source of conflict by reducing those parts of the food aid

¹⁶ By contrast the US has notified only between 1 and 2 percent of the total of notified export subsidies.

program that are most closely identified with surplus disposal and with market development. The EU will also be satisfied with additional constraints on state trading exporters, though it is unlikely that the removal of the monopoly powers of such traders will be possible on this occasion.

Conclusion

The EU has positioned itself, through significant changes in policy in recent years, to be able to accept further disciplines on the most trade-distorting types of domestic support. The notified domestic support falling under the Green Box has sharply risen at the expense of the Blue Box subsidies and those that are included in the Total AMS. As a result, the EU could maintain current policies in much their present form until the final year of the transition, assumed to be about 2014/15, at which point the constraints could become binding. This conclusion rests on the assumption that the Single Farm Payment System (SPS) that was agreed in 2003 and is being progressively introduced, qualifies for the Green Box.

The relative ease with which the EU can adjust to cuts in trade-distorting domestic support gives it some room to insist on deep cuts by other countries. In particular, the EU has a strong interest in ensuring that it does not have to face a highly subsidized US agricultural sector. So the EU is in the somewhat unfamiliar position of being able to request changes to others' policies and not spend so long defending the CAP against the demands of others.

However, the EU is on the defensive when it comes to market access. The revised draft modalities would imply deep liberalization of agricultural markets in Europe. The progressive nature of the tariff-cutting formula means that the handful of highly protected sectors would experience large falls in their average bound duties, with potentially significant implications for European producers. The flexibility allowed for sensitive products changes somewhat the picture, but our calculations suggest that liberalization would remain significant even in the most protected sectors such as sugar or meat products.

At this point, it remains unclear whether this proposal is likely to be deemed palatable by European representatives. The proposed liberalization clearly overcomes the initial European proposal, recently again claimed by Member Countries' officials to be a "red line". But a negotiation entails bargaining, and agricultural market access liberalization is clearly for the EU a *sine qua non* condition to obtain concessions in other domains.

Finally, while this analysis focuses on the direct consequences of tariff-cutting provisions, it should be kept in mind that other provisions may also matter. This may be the case in particular of the provisions concerning safeguard measures. As a result of the Uruguay Round, the EU notified 31 eight-digit tariff lines as being potentially concerned by the Special Agricultural Safeguard (SSG). Limiting to 1.5 per cent of scheduled tariff lines (i.e. 33 eight-digit tariff lines for the EU), as suggested in the draft modalities, would thus considerably limit the scope for such safeguard. Together with other restrictions in the application of these safeguards, as well as in the Special Safeguard Mechanism (SSM), this should also be an important dimension of a potential agreement.

The export competition part of the agricultural modalities would not be particularly problematic for the EU to adopt. The elimination of export subsidies has been on the domestic agenda for some time, as it becomes increasingly difficult to justify spending scarce funds to subsidize consumers (or industrial competitors) in other countries. As prices fall to levels closer to those on the world market, the need for such subsidies is reduced. The unpopularity of such subsidies in a global context, where virtually all other countries want these policies removed, leaves the EU with a high political cost if it chooses to maintain them.¹⁷

¹⁷ On the other hand, if they are on their way out for domestic reasons, the negotiating benefit of offering to give them up is reduced.

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Table 1: EU Notifications of Domestic Support, and Composition of Support, 1995/96 to 2003/04 and Estimates to 2006/07

	1995/96	1996/97	1997/98	1998/99	1999/2000	2000/01	2001/02	2002/03	2003/04	2004/05	2005/06	2006/07
	€ billion											
Green Box	18.7	22.1	18.2	19.2	19.9	21.8	20.7	20.4	22.1	22.1	32.5	36.6
Blue Box	20.8	21.5	20.4	20.5	19.8	22.2	23.7	24.7	24.8	24.3	11.0	3.6
Current total AMS	47.5	51.0	50.2	46.7	47.9	43.7	39.3	28.5	30.9	32.9	29.0	25.8
PS de minimis "used"	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.9	0.9	0.9
NPS de minimis "used"	0.8	0.7	0.5	0.3	0.3	0.5	0.6	0.9	1.1	1.0	1.0	1.0
Total Support	87.9	95.4	89.3	86.7	87.9	88.3	84.2	74.6	78.8	81.2	74.4	67.9
	Share of Total Support											
Green Box	21.3%	23.2%	20.3%	22.1%	22.7%	24.8%	24.5%	27.4%	28.0%	27.2%	43.7%	53.9%
Blue Box	23.7%	22.6%	22.9%	23.6%	22.5%	25.2%	28.2%	33.2%	31.5%	29.9%	14.8%	5.3%
Current total AMS	54.1%	53.5%	56.2%	53.8%	54.5%	49.5%	46.6%	38.2%	39.2%	40.6%	39.0%	38.0%
De Minimis	0.9%	0.8%	0.5%	0.4%	0.3%	0.6%	0.7%	1.3%	1.3%	2.3%	2.5%	2.8%
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
URAA AMS Binding	78.7	76.4	74.1	71.8	69.5	67.2	67.2	67.2	67.2	67.2	67.2	67.2
Share of Binding	60.4%	66.8%	67.8%	65.1%	68.9%	65.0%	58.5%	42.4%	46.0%	49.1%	43.2%	38.5%

Source: WTO EU Notifications (1995/96 – 2003/04) and Author's Estimates (2004/05 – 2006/07)

Table 2: Main Domestic Support Provisions of the Revised Draft Modalities (February 2008) as applied to the EU

Item	Initial Values	Reduction
Overall Trade-Distorting Domestic Support (OTDS)	Base OTDS=Final Bound Total AMS+10 percent of the value of production in the base period (1995-2000)+average Blue Box payments in base period (a)	Base level reduction of [75] [85] percent. Initial reduction of 1/3 in first year: remaining reductions in five equal steps
Total Aggregate Measure of Support (AMS)	Base level is Final Bound Total AMS (from Uruguay Round schedules)	Base level reduction of 70 percent. Initial reduction of 25 percent in first year: remaining reductions over five years.
Product-specific AMS	Base level is average of 1995-2000	Base period levels not to be exceeded (b)
<i>De minimis</i>	Base level is five percent of value of production for non-product specific support and five percent of the value of production of products that receive product-specific support	Reduction of [50] [60] percent [from the start of the implementation period] [in five equal steps].
Blue Box		Capped at 2.5 percent of value of production in base period (1995-2000) applied from start of implementation period.
Product-specific Blue Box		Product specific caps at average value in 1995-2000 period (c).
Cotton AMS		Reduced by 74.29 percent in two years, with a 25 percent reduction in the first year

Table 3: OTDS, Total AMS, *de minimis*, and Total Blue Box Commitments for the EU under Revised Draft Modalities

	Million euro
URA Final Bound Total AMS (million euro)	67,160.0
Value of Production (million euro)	222,576.5
10% value of production (1995-2000) (million euro)	22,257.7
5% value of production (1995-2000) (million euro)	11,128.8
Blue Box (in excess of 5% value of production) (a)	20,887.9
Base OTDS	110,305.6
OTDS (85% reduction) (million euro)	16,545.8
OTDS (75% reduction) (million euro)	27,576.4
DDA Final Bound Total AMS (70% reduction) (million euro)	20,148.0
AMS/production 1995-2000 (b)	21.5%
Total Blue Box	
2.5% value of production (1995-2000) (million euro)	5,564.4
Average Blue Box relative to Base OTDS (c)	18.9%
Cotton	
Base AMS for cotton (million euro)	752.7
Cotton AMS reduction (assuming 70% total AMS reduction) (d)	74.3

Note a: tests for Para 1 condition, picks up Blue Box when above 5% of production value

Note b: this tests for application of paragraph 15, less than 40%, additional effort does not apply

Note c: test for para 39: less than 40 percent so no phased reduction allowed

Note d: Application of cotton reduction formula paragraph 55 for AMS

Source: Author's calculations based on WTO (2008)

Table 4: Phased Reduction of OTDS and AMS, and *de minimis* limits, EU, under Revised Draft Modalities

	Immediate	Year 1	Year 2	Year 3	Year 4	Year 5
Reductions						
Proportions of the base OTDS to be cut						
OTDS (85% reduction) (a)	0.33	0.43	0.54	0.64	0.75	0.85
OTDS (75% reduction) (a)	0.33	0.41	0.50	0.58	0.67	0.75
AMS (25% initial; 70% total reduction)	0.25	0.34	0.43	0.52	0.61	0.70
Cotton AMS (25% initial, 74.29% total) (c)	0.25	0.74	0.74	0.74	0.74	0.74
Scheduled Limits						
OTDS (85% reduction) (million euro)	73,904.7	62,432.9	50,961.2	39,489.4	28,017.6	16,545.8
OTDS (75% reduction) (million euro)	73,904.7	64,639.1	55,373.4	46,107.7	36,842.1	27,576.4
AMS (25% initial; 70% total reduction) (million euro)	50,370.0	44,325.6	38,281.2	32,236.8	26,192.4	20,148.0
Cotton AMS(25% initial; 74.29% total) (million euro)(d)	564.6	193.6	193.6			
De minimis						
50% immediate reduction de minimis	2.5%					
60% immediate reduction de minimis	2.0%					
50% phased (5 year) reduction de minimis		4.5%	4.0%	3.5%	3.0%	2.5%
60% phased (5 year) reduction de minimis		4.4%	3.8%	3.2%	2.6%	2.0%

Note a: Initial reduction of one third, with remainder phased-in in five equal steps (paragraph 5)

Note b: Initial reduction of 25%, with remainder phased-in in five equal steps (paragraph 15)

Note c: two year phase in period for cotton, with higher total reduction percentage

Note d: Implementation period for cotton specified as one-third of the general period

Source: Authors' calculations based on WTO (2008)

Table 5: Product-specific AMS bindings, EU, under Revised Draft Modalities

<i>Product</i>	Average AMS 1995-2000	year 1	year 2	year 3	2003/04 level	
	million euro					
Common wheat	2,784	2,784	2,784	2,784	2,784	1,455
Durum wheat	0	-	-	-	-	-
Barley	2,509	2,509	2,509	2,509	2,509	1,860
Maize	905	905	905	905	905	391
Rye	297	297	297	297	297	243
Oats	10	10	10	10	10	-
Sorghum	20	20	20	20	20	9
Triticale	211	228	222	217	211	275
Rice	464	464	464	464	464	421
White sugar	5,852	5,852	5,852	5,852	5,852	5,610
Skimmed milk powder	1,562	1,623	1,603	1,582	1,562	1,602
Butter	4,288	4,728	4,581	4,434	4,288	5,012
Milk	0	-	-	-	-	-
Beef	13,155	13,155	13,155	13,155	13,155	-
Pigmeat	0	0	0	0	0	-
Dried fodder	305	319	314	309	305	319
Chick-peas, lentils and vetches	70	71	71	70	70	71
Olive oil	1,910	2,386	2,227	2,069	1,910	2,649
Tobacco	962	962	962	962	962	924
Bananas	226	244	238	232	226	233
Apples	2,155	2,372	2,300	2,227	2,155	2,625
Pears	622	622	622	622	622	584
Apricots	124	124	124	124	124	110
Cherries	136	166	156	146	136	203
Peaches/Nectarines	439	439	439	439	439	398
Table grapes	247	247	247	247	247	185
Plums	77	85	82	79	77	96
Lemons	359	359	359	359	359	329
Clementines	188	195	193	190	188	188
Mandarins	48	48	48	48	48	30
Satsumas	32	32	32	32	32	22
Oranges	390	390	390	390	390	329
Cucumbers	568	687	647	607	568	781
Courgettes	152	152	152	152	152	112
Artichokes	185	186	186	185	185	179
Tomatoes	3,146	3,146	3,146	3,146	3,146	1,888

Table 5 (contd.): Product-specific AMS bindings, EU, under Revised Draft Modalities

<i>Product</i>	Average AMS 1995-2000 million euro	year 1	year 2	year 3	2003/04 level
Wine	1,711	1,711	1,711	1,711	-
Ethyl alcohol of agricultural origin	0	-	-	-	99
Seed for sowing	100	100	100	100	108
Hemp	14	14	14	14	1
Flax fibre	101	101	101	101	17
Silkworms	0	0	0	0	0
Hops	15	15	15	15	13
Cotton	753	753	753	753	769
Cauliflower	3	3	3	3	-
Aubergines	0	-	-	-	0
Other Fruit and vegetables	0	0	0	0	2
Asparagus	0	-	-	-	-
Citrus fruit for processing	150	195	180	165	193
Lemons for processing	37	38	37	37	46
Tinned pineapple	4	4	4	4	-
Peaches for processing	69	69	69	69	12
Plums for processing	33	35	34	33	35
Pears for processing	32	32	32	32	16
Figs for processing	5	6	6	6	6
Tomatoes for processing	341	341	341	341	316
Grapes for processing	61	79	73	67	115
Potatoes for processing to starch	0	-	-	-	-

Source: Author's calculations based on WTO (2008)

Table 6: Product-Specific Blue Box bindings, EU, Revised Draft Modalities

	Average 1995-2000 million euro
Payments- fixed area and yields	
Maize payments	1,206
Other cereals	9,404
Oilseeds payments	2,126
Pulses payments	548
Flaxseeds payments	147
Set-aside compensation	1,640
Durum supplements	1,020
voluntary set-aside payments	0
silage payments	10
rice payments	60
<i>total crop payments</i>	16,161
Livestock payments - fixed number of head	
Suckler cow premium	1,876
Special beef and veal premium	1,352
Slaughter premium	82
Beef supplemental payments	25
Deseasonalization premium	22
Ewe and goat premium	1,370
<i>Total livestock payments</i>	<i>4,727</i>
TOTAL BLUE (notified)	20,888

Source: Author's calculations based on EU notifications

Table 7: Initial bound protection level in the EU (base year 2004, AVE in %)

HS chapter	Import-weighted mean	Unweighted mean	Reference group-weighted mean	Mean AVE of specific component	Mean binding overhang	Mean effectively applied duty	Highest bound duty	Share in EU agric. imports
1 Live Animals	1.7	19.5	26.7	0.6	0.5	1.2	114.1	0.7
2 Meat and Offal	67.5	42.2	73.3	58.8	0.0	67.5	407.8	5.3
4 Dairy products	55.9	76.9	70.9	52.2	0.0	55.9	264.3	2.0
5 Other animal products	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	1.2
6 Live trees	7.3	5.9	7.9	0.0	0.1	7.1	12.0	1.8
7 Vegetables	25.0	17.4	23.0	17.9	4.4	20.6	118.9	4.0
8 Edible Fruit and Nuts	19.2	9.8	18.0	14.1	6.0	13.2	29.3	14.6
9 Coffee and Tea	0.7	2.4	1.2	0.0	0.0	0.7	12.5	6.1
10 Cereals	78.4	69.8	88.2	76.7	42.8	35.6	93.6	4.2
11 Milling products, starch	44.4	56.3	59.9	41.0	0.4	44.1	100.8	0.2
12 Oilseeds	0.3	7.7	0.5	0.0	0.0	0.3	179.1	8.7
13 Gums and resins	1.3	1.9	1.3	0.0	0.0	1.3	19.2	0.8
14 Vegetable Plaiting	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.2
15 Animal/Vegetable Fats	11.9	14.3	10.7	7.0	0.0	11.9	118.7	5.3
16 Prepared meat or fish	28.4	23.8	27.8	18.7	0.0	28.4	87.6	0.9
17 Sugar	129.1	67.6	104.4	127.4	0.2	128.9	218.1	3.0
18 Cocoa and preparation	3.1	8.7	4.6	0.1	0.0	3.1	66.4	5.3
19 Cereal preparations	16.7	23.2	18.3	7.7	0.1	16.6	50.1	1.1
20 Vegetable preparations	27.2	28.5	28.7	8.4	3.5	23.7	217.4	5.6
21 Miscellaneous food	10.5	12.0	10.5	3.6	1.6	8.9	69.3	2.5
22 Beverages and spirits	8.4	17.0	8.4	8.0	0.3	8.1	136.8	5.8
23 Food residues	28.7	49.5	37.8	28.5	0.0	28.7	174.9	8.2
24 Tobacco	18.6	31.0	24.4	0.0	0.0	18.6	74.9	4.3
29 Organic Chemicals	14.3	36.6	18.9	9.4	0.0	14.2	56.2	0.0
33 Essential Oils/Perfumes	7.3	3.6	7.9	0.0	2.4	4.9	17.3	1.2
35 Albuminoids	8.4	13.1	11.1	3.4	0.1	8.3	29.3	0.9
38 Misc Chemicals	3.5	18.2	4.4	0.3	0.2	3.3	66.0	1.1
41 Hides and Skins	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0	1.2
43 Furs	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0	0.3
50 Silk	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0	0.1
51 Wool	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0	1.6
52 Cotton	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0	1.8
53 Other Vegetable Fibres	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0	0.0
Agricultural products	22.9	23.4	29.5	18.1	3.1	19.8	407.8	100.0

Source: Authors' calculations based on MACMap-HS6 version 2 and TARIC (European Commission).

Note: Unless otherwise specified, import-weighted averages are reported. The binding overhang is computed as the difference, in percentage points, between bound and applied duties.

Table 8: Distribution of European tariff lines by band (number of tariff lines, 8 digits)

HS chapter	Number of tariff lines by band				Total
	Band I (<20%)	Band II ([20%;50%])	Band III ([50%;75%])	Band IV (>75%)	
1 Live Animals	31	3	5	8	47
2 Meat and Offal	127	50	22	34	233
4 Dairy products	33	44	44	54	175
6 Live trees	48	0	0	0	48
7 Vegetables	109	7	2	4	122
8 Edible Fruit and Nuts	140	61	0	0	201
9 Coffee and Tea	56	0	0	0	56
10 Cereals	19	23	7	6	55
11 Milling products, starch	28	32	18	5	83
12 Oilseeds	78	0	1	1	80
13 Gums and resins	19	0	0	0	19
15 Animal/Vegetable Fats	110	3	4	3	120
16 Prepared meat or fish	34	4	5	2	45
17 Sugar	30	6	2	9	47
18 Cocoa and preparation	18	7	2	0	27
19 Cereal preparations	33	14	1	0	48
20 Vegetable preparations	214	76	7	10	307
21 Miscellaneous food	36	5	1	0	42
22 Beverages and spirits	165	6	1	4	176
23 Food residues	51	2	4	9	66
24 Tobacco	23	3	4	0	30
29 Organic Chemicals	1	3	2	0	6
33 Essential Oils/Perfumes	36	0	0	0	36
35 Albuminoids	24	1	0	0	25
38 Misc Chemicals	11	2	2	0	15
Agricultural products	1569	352	134	149	2204

Source: Authors' calculations based on TARIC (European Commission).

Note: Chapters with no dutiable products (i.e. chapters 5, 14, 41, 43, 50-53) are not reported. Tariff lines are defined here at the eight-digit level of the Combined Nomenclature.

Table 9: Impact of the tariff-cutting formula and associated provisions on European bound duties (in % AVE)

HS chapter	Initial bound duties	After formula only	After formula + trop. products	After formula + prod. + tariff esc.
1 Live Animals	1.7	0.8	0.8	0.8
2 Meat and Offal	67.5	23.0	23.0	23.0
4 Dairy products	55.9	20.1	20.1	20.1
6 Live trees	7.3	3.6	2.0	2.0
7 Vegetables	25.0	9.6	9.4	9.4
8 Edible Fruit and Nuts	19.2	8.5	6.8	6.8
9 Coffee and Tea	0.7	0.3	0.0	0.0
10 Cereals	78.4	26.2	25.8	25.8
9 Milling products, starch	44.4	16.2	14.2	14.2
12 Oilseeds	0.3	0.1	0.1	0.1
13 Gums and resins	1.3	0.7	0.3	0.3
15 Animal/Vegetable Fats	11.9	5.0	3.2	3.2
16 Prepared meat or fish	28.4	12.7	12.7	12.7
17 Sugar	129.1	41.2	41.2	41.2
18 Cocoa and preparation	3.1	1.6	0.5	0.5
19 Cereal preparations	16.6	8.1	8.1	8.1
20 Vegetable preparations	27.2	12.0	10.9	10.9
21 Miscellaneous food	10.5	5.2	4.3	4.3
22 Beverages and spirits	8.4	3.9	3.9	3.9
23 Food residues	28.7	9.2	9.2	7.9
24 Tobacco	18.6	8.7	6.1	6.1
29 Organic Chemicals	14.3	5.6	5.6	5.6
33 Essential Oils/Perfumes	7.3	3.7	3.0	3.0
35 Albuminoids	8.4	3.9	3.9	3.9
38 Misc Chemicals	3.5	1.7	1.7	1.7
Agricultural products	22.9	8.5	7.9	7.7

Source: Authors' calculations based on MacMap-HS6 version 2 and TARIC (European Commission).

Table 10: Impact of the tariff-cutting formula and associated provisions on European applied preferential duties

HS chapter	Applied preferential duty (%)		Avg preferential margin (p.p.)	
	Initial level	After formula	Initial level	After formula
1 Live Animals	1.0	0.5	0.3	0.1
2 Meat and Offal	66.7	22.8	0.8	0.2
4 Dairy products	52.5	19.2	3.5	0.9
6 Live trees	2.6	0.9	4.5	1.2
7 Vegetables	16.6	6.3	4.0	1.3
8 Edible Fruit and Nuts	11.5	4.0	1.7	0.8
9 Coffee and Tea	0.3	0.0	0.4	0.0
10 Cereals	34.2	20.5	1.4	1.0
11 Milling products, starch	39.3	13.1	4.8	1.0
12 Oilseeds	0.2	0.1	0.1	0.0
13 Gums and resins	0.9	0.3	0.4	0.0
15 Animal/Vegetable Fats	10.6	3.0	1.3	0.2
16 Prepared meat or fish	27.9	12.5	0.5	0.2
17 Sugar	101.5	33.4	27.4	7.7
18 Cocoa and preparation	0.6	0.1	2.6	0.4
19 Cereal preparations	10.0	6.1	6.5	1.9
20 Vegetable preparations	18.2	9.3	5.6	1.6
21 Miscellaneous food	6.0	3.5	2.9	0.8
22 Beverages and spirits	6.7	3.4	1.4	0.5
23 Food residues	17.8	4.8	10.9	3.0
24 Tobacco	11.9	4.4	6.7	1.7
29 Organic Chemicals	11.3	4.2	2.9	1.4
33 Essential Oils/Perfumes	3.2	2.5	1.7	0.4
35 Albuminoids	6.7	3.4	1.6	0.5
38 Misc Chemicals	0.5	0.3	2.8	1.4
Agricultural products	16.2	6.2	3.5	1.0

Source: Authors' calculations based on MAcMap-HS6 version 2 and TARIC (European Commission).

Note: "After formula" refers to duties once the tariff-cutting formula is applied, including its additional provisions concerning tariff escalation and tropical products, but without any exemption concerning sensitive products. Chapters with no dutiable products (i.e. chapters 5, 14, 41, 43, 50-53) are not reported. The average preferential margin is computed as the average across all partners and all products of the difference between the MFN and the effectively applied rate, in percentage points.

Table 11 Preferential margins by partner before, and after formula implementation.

	Initial preferential margins %	After formula only %	After formula + tropical products %	After formula + trop. Prod. + tariff. Esc. %	After formula + trop. Prod. + tariff. Esc. + Sensitive products %
World	3.5	1.3	1.1	1.0	1.4
Developed countries	3.3	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.6
Developing non LDC, non G90	2.9	1.0	0.9	0.8	1.1
Developing G90	3.3	1.5	0.9	0.9	0.9
LDC	19.3	6.9	6.2	6.2	9.5

Table 12: Highest-ranking products in terms of sensitivity criterion in the EU

Rank	HS6 code	Label	Initial MFN duty	Post-formula	With 2/3 cut	Assessed initial share of imports in quotas (%)	Assessed TRQ creation (share in initial imports, %)
1	170111	Raw cane sugar	177.2	55.8	96.3	37.0	19.6
2	230890	Maize stalks, maize leaves	423.7	89.9	201.2	0.0	n.a.
3	080300	Bananas	39.6	12.5	21.5	21.6	n.a.
4	170199	Cane or beet sugar	160.9	50.7	87.4	0.7	59.9
5	230990	Animal food preparations	116.6	36.7	63.3	2.5	n.a.
6	020230	Boneless frozen bovine meat	124.4	39.2	67.6	19.1	23.1
7	020130	Fresh or chilled bovine meat boneless	88.2	27.8	47.9	7.6	17.1
8	071410	Fresh or dried manioc `cassava`	139.3	41.1	73.8	99.8	n.a.
9	020442	Frozen cuts of sheep unboned	67.5	24.6	38.9	70.6	3.8
10	100630	Semi-milled or wholly milled rice	141.5	41.8	75.0	7.9	10.4
11	040510	Butter	78.5	24.7	42.7	57.1	32.5
12	070320	Garlic fresh or chilled	201.6	63.5	109.5	5.1	n.a.
13	020443	Frozen boned cuts of sheep	80.3	25.3	43.6	72.7	7.7
14	230310	Residues of starch manufacture	94.8	29.9	51.5	0.0	n.a.
15	020714	Frozen offal of fowls	50.9	18.6	29.4	4.1	36.8

Source: Authors' calculations based on MacMap-HS6 version 2 and TARIC (European Commission).

Note: "Post-formula" refers to MFN duty once the formula has been applied, including its additional provisions concerning tariff escalation and tropical products. Column 4 refers to the share of initial imports actually entering in quotas; it is an assessment based on available information about quotas and imports, based on simplifying assumption, since this information is not provided as such by the EU. Assessed TRQ creation, in column 5, is computed based on the hypothesis that it amounts to 4% of domestic consumption (3% in the case of sheep meat), consistent with the hypothesis that 2/3 the formula cut is applied to sensitive products.

Table 13: Assessed impact of sensitive products exemption on EU market access liberalization

	Import-weighted averages						Unweighted averages					
	Initial level	Final, without sensitive product	% cut	Final, with sensitive products	% cut		Initial level	Final, without sensitive product	% cut	Final, with sensitive products	% cut	Share in EU's ag. imports
All agricultural product	22.9	7.7	66.2	11.2	51.3		23.4	8.3	64.6	9.5	59.6	100%
Non-sensitive prod.	9.5	3.5	63.0	3.5	63.0		19.2	7.0	63.5	7.0	63.5	82%
Sensitive prod.	83.8	27.0	67.8	45.9	45.2		105.4	32.9	68.8	57.1	45.8	18%
Std-deviation across ag. products	41.9	12.6	70.0	21.6	48.3		40.3	12.5	69.1	17.4	57.0	
Individual HS Chapters including sensitive products:												
2	67.5	23.0	66.0	36.4	46.1		42.2	15.4	63.5	17.6	58.2	5%
4	55.9	20.1	64.1	29.2	47.8		76.9	26.1	66.1	31.4	59.2	2%
7	25.0	9.4	62.5	12.5	50.0		17.4	7.1	59.3	8.5	51.2	4%
8	19.2	6.8	64.7	9.0	52.9		9.8	3.9	60.2	4.1	58.5	15%
10	78.4	25.8	67.1	35.3	54.9		69.8	22.7	67.5	28.0	59.8	4%
15	11.9	3.2	73.5	4.4	62.8		14.3	4.5	68.2	5.1	64.0	5%
16	28.4	12.7	55.2	16.2	43.0		23.8	10.9	54.2	11.8	50.6	1%
17	129.1	41.2	68.1	69.5	46.2		67.6	22.9	66.1	28.9	57.3	3%
20	27.2	10.9	59.9	12.5	54.1		28.5	10.8	62.2	11.6	59.1	6%
22	8.4	3.9	53.7	4.3	48.6		17.0	6.6	61.4	7.1	58.2	6%
23	28.7	7.9	72.6	14.7	48.7		49.5	14.3	71.1	21.5	56.5	8%
24	18.6	6.1	67.4	6.8	63.2		31.0	10.9	64.9	11.7	62.1	4%

Source: Authors' calculations based on MacMap-HS6 version 2 and TARIC (European Commission).

Table 14 Protection faced by EU exporters, by partner.

	Initial %	Complete formula %	After formula + trop. Prod. + tariff. Esc. %	After formula + trop. Prod. + tariff. Esc. + Sensitive products %
WTO	18.2	11.5	11.7	14.2
Developed	18.9	9.0	8.8	12.1
Developing	19.1	15.2	15.2	17.8
SVE	18.6	17.5	17.9	18.3
RAM	14.1	10.9	12.8	13.1
LDC	14.4	14.0	14.4	14.4

Table 15. Protection faced by EU exporters, by chapter.

	Initial %	Complete f %	After formula + trop. Prod. + tariff. Esc. + Sensitive products %	After formula + trop. Prod. + tariff. Esc. + Sensitive products %
1 Live Animals	4.7	3.1	3.2	3.9
2 Meat and Offal	64.3	25.5	25.7	38.6
4 Dairy products	23.7	16.5	16.7	20.6
5 Other animal products	9.2	6.7	7.0	7.9
6 Live trees	25.4	10.3	9.6	15.2
7 Vegetables	38.3	17.0	17.2	23.7
8 Edible Fruit and Nuts	17.0	10.1	10.2	12.3
9 Coffee and Tea	4.5	3.3	3.1	3.4
10 Cereals	24.9	17.3	17.5	22.7
9 Milling products, starch	24.1	15.7	15.9	19.8
12 Oilseeds	9.5	7.3	7.4	8.0
13 Gums and resins	7.1	5.0	4.7	5.9
14 Vegetable Plaiting	9.4	6.5	6.4	8.3
15 Animal/Vegetable Fats	12.4	9.4	9.3	10.1
16 Prepared meat or fish	36.3	18.2	18.3	24.2
17 Sugar	13.8	10.9	11.2	11.9
18 Cocoa and preparation	12.6	8.1	8.1	9.9
19 Cereal preparations	11.9	9.6	9.7	10.3
20 Vegetable preparations	17.9	11.7	11.8	13.0
21 Miscellaneous food	12.4	10.2	10.3	11.2
22 Beverages and spirits	12.3	8.8	9.1	10.2
23 Food residues	12.1	9.4	9.4	10.2
24 Tobacco	26.5	21.4	23.3	24.9
29 Organic Chemicals	5.8	4.5	4.6	4.7
33 Essential Oils/Perfumes	9.5	8.7	8.7	9.0
35 Albuminoids	13.1	8.1	8.1	10.4
38 Misc Chemicals	5.3	4.3	4.4	4.5
41 Hides and Skins	1.2	1.0	1.0	1.0
43 Furs	1.3	0.9	1.0	1.0
50 Silk	12.0	11.5	11.5	11.7
51 Wool	10.8	7.9	8.5	8.5
52 Cotton	4.5	3.3	3.5	4.0
53 Other Vegetable Fibres	5.7	4.3	4.6	4.6
Agricultural products	18.2	11.5	11.7	14.2

Table 16: Export Subsidy Outlays and Quantities Exported with Subsidies: Amounts Notified and WTO Ceiling Commitments, and Food Aid Quantities, 2002/03

<i>Product</i>	<i>Outlays (million euro)</i>	<i>Commitment (million euro)</i>	<i>Quantity (thousand tons)</i>	<i>Commitment (thousand tons)</i>	<i>Food Aid (thousand tons)</i>
Wheat and wheat flour	141.2	1289.7	12055.3	14438	406
Coarse Grains	167	1046.9	6259.3	10843.2	86.5
Rice	24.9	36.8	127.7	133.4	42.3
Rapeseed	0	27.7	0	103.8	0
Olive Oil	0	54.3	0	115	0
Sugar (a)	292.5	499.1	600.5	1273.5	16.7
Butter and butteroil	545.1	947.8	292	399.3	0.3
Skim milk powder	163	275.8	220.2	272.5	0
Cheese	267.7	341.7	317	321.3	0.6
Other Milk products	596.2	697.7	833.4	958.1	0.6
Beef	285.1	1253.6	358.6	821.7	8.6
Pigmeat	14.6	191.3	61	443.5	0
Poultry	90.5	90.7	247.4	286	0
Eggs	5.1	43.7	59.5	98.8	0
Wine	17.9	39.2	2096	2304.7	0
Fresh F&V	15.3	52.8	711	753.4	0
Processed F&V	3.1	8.3	66.9	143.3	0
Tobacco (raw)	0	40.2	0	110.8	0
Alcohol	90.4	96.1	850	1147.4	0
Incorporated products	413.6	415	-	-	18.8


Table 17: Summary of Main Provisions of Export Competition Revised Draft Modalities

Item	Agreement	Implementation
Export Subsidies	Eliminate remaining scheduled export subsidies by end 2013	Budgetary outlays reduced by 50 percent by end 2010 in equal installments, and reduced to zero in equal installments by end 2013 Quantities eligible for subsidy [reduced in equal installments] [applied as a standstill over implementation period at lower of current levels or bound levels reduced by 20 percent]
Export credits	Terms and Conditions	Maximum repayment term for export financing 180 days (a); Export credit guarantee, risk insurance, and other risk coverage programs to be self-financing; Least Developed and Net Food Importing Developing Countries allowed a repayment term of 360 days for the acquisition of basic foodstuffs
Food Aid	Guidelines for food aid and additional monitoring: classification of different types of food aid	Food Aid to be (i) Needs-driven; (ii) given in grant form; (iii) not linked to exports or market development; and (iv) not re-exported. In-kind food aid needs to take into account local market decisions. Emergency food aid follows declaration of emergency and an assessment of needs: no monetization of such food aid. Non-emergency food aid should be based on a needs assessment and minimize commercial displacement: monetization of non-emergency food aid would be [prohibited] [restricted].
Exporting State Trading Enterprises	Eliminate trade distorting practices by exporting STEs	Eliminate export subsidies, government financing and government underwriting of losses provided by or to STEs; [and eliminate the use of export monopoly powers by STEs by 2013] (Note: No such STEs notified by EU)

(a) implemented from the date of the agreement or the end of 2010 if earlier.


Source: Author's summary based on WTO (2008)

Figure 1: EU Notifications of Domestic Support, 1995/96 to 2003/04 with Estimates to 2006/07



Source: WTO EU Notifications and Author's Estimates

Figure 2: EU Domestic Support Levels and DDA Proposed Limits



Source: Authors' estimates